Your managed entry point is published as a name, but a partner allowlisted the single address it resolved once, so why does that break?
answer
- the name is the contract
- a resolved address is a snapshot
- the pool moves for ordinary reasons
- partner outbound rule, your destination
- reachability is not authentication
basics
~20 sA published name fronts a set of addresses the platform changes as the pool grows, moves or heals. An address resolved once is a snapshot with a lifetime, so the partner's outbound rule eventually points at an address your door no longer answers on.
solid answer
~50 sThe partner's firewall permits outbound traffic to exactly one destination — the address it resolved for your entry point on the day it was configured. But that address was one member of a set the platform manages: it adds, replaces and moves addresses as the pool scales across zones or is healed, and the name is the only thing that tracks those changes. When the set moves, the partner's rule points at an address your door no longer answers on, and their calls fail with no change on either side's deployment. The fix is to decide deliberately: either the partner re-resolves the name and trusts it, or you reserve a stable address and attach it, accepting that you have now pinned yourself. What you should not do is let an address filter stand in for authentication.
go deeper
Recall that a published name can stand in front of several addresses, and that the platform may change them, so the name is what callers should use.
Explain why each resolution is a snapshot with a lifetime, and what a reserved address changes about the guarantee you can make.
Diagnose the late, intermittent failure with no recent deployment on either side, and negotiate the alternative rather than promising an address will not move.
Decide when an external address dependency becomes a contract your organisation accepts, and require authentication that does not rest on where a call came from.
## A name in front of a moving set When a platform publishes a managed entry point as a **name**, the name is the contract and the addresses behind it are an implementation detail the platform reserves the right to change. It changes them for ordinary reasons: the pool grows into another availability zone, an unhealthy member is replaced, capacity is rebalanced, or the fleet is migrated. Each resolution of the name is therefore a **snapshot with a lifetime**, and the lifetime is short by design so the platform can move without coordinating with anyone. A partner that resolves the name once and writes the answer into a firewall rule has converted that snapshot into a permanent assumption. Nothing warns them, because nothing they own has changed. ## Which direction the rule points Be precise about the direction, because two different mechanisms are easy to confuse: - **The case here:** the partner calls *you*. Their **outbound** rule names your entry point's address as the permitted destination. What breaks it is your door's address changing. - **The other case:** you call *the partner*, and they permit your **source** address inbound. That one is about the address your traffic leaves from, which is a different subject entirely. Everything below is about the first case: a destination allowlist pointed at a rented front door. ## Why the failure arrives late and looks like nothing The change is silent on both sides, and the gap between cause and symptom is the reason this is a senior question: - The platform adds or replaces an address in the set; your service is entirely healthy throughout. - The old address often keeps answering for a while, as the platform drains it, so nothing fails immediately. - Some of the partner's calls succeed and some fail, depending on which member they had pinned, which reads like an intermittent fault rather than a configuration one. - When it finally fails completely, the last deployment on either side was weeks ago, so the change log points nowhere. - The partner's evidence — a name that resolves fine from a developer's laptop — makes it look like your problem. ## What to offer instead | option | what it gives the partner | what it costs you | |---|---|---| | re-resolve the published name, honour its lifetime | tracks every change the platform makes | requires the partner's stack to resolve names at call time | | a reserved address you allocate and attach | a genuinely stable destination to pin | you hold an allocation, pay for it, and are pinned to it | | the provider's published address ranges | a rule that will not break | far too broad: those ranges cover many tenants, so the rule permits much more than you | | mutual authentication instead of address filtering | proof of who is calling, not where from | a credential or certificate to manage on both sides | The honest answer in most reviews is the second row combined with the fourth: reserve a stable address because the partner's appliance genuinely cannot re-resolve, and put real authentication on the call so the address is a convenience rather than a control. ## An address is not an identity The deeper error underneath the allowlist is treating reachability as authorization. Being able to reach a destination proves nothing about who is calling, and being reached at a known address proves nothing about who is answering. Address filters are a useful blunt reduction of exposure; they are not authentication in either direction, and a design that relies on one to establish trust has one control where it believes it has two. ## Making the decision deliberately When a partner asks for an address, the right response is three questions. Can your side re-resolve at call time — and if not, what is the actual constraint? Is the dependency contractual, so that a change on our side needs a change window on yours? And what authenticates the call, separately from where it comes from? If the answers lead to pinning, pin it properly: reserve the allocation, document that it is now an external contract, and put it on the list of things that an environment rebuild must preserve. A pinned address that nobody recorded as a commitment is the version of this that fails twice.
- Why might this failure appear intermittently for weeks before it becomes total?Because the set changes gradually. A pinned member may be drained rather than removed at once, and the partner's rule may still match some members and not others, so a proportion of calls succeeds. The intermittency is what makes teams chase application faults instead of the pinned rule.
- When is giving the partner a reserved, stable address actually the right answer?When their side genuinely cannot resolve names at call time, or when a contract or regulator names the destination. Accept it knowingly: you hold and pay for the allocation, you record it as an external commitment, and any future move of the entry point now needs a coordinated change window with them.
saying these in an interview costs you the question
- Treats a resolved address as permanent because it worked yesterday
- Thinks a managed pool keeps one address forever
- Allowlists the provider's whole published range and calls it narrow
- Treats reaching a known address as proof of identity
- Believes a long cache lifetime is safer than re-resolving
- Pins an address without recording it as an external commitment