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Compare always-on and on-demand scrubbing diversion: what does each cost on a quiet day and expose during a flood?

level: middleimportance: should knowfreq 58%

answer

  1. one has a gap, one has a tax
  2. what happens on the quiet days
  3. detect, decide, activate, converge
  4. bursts shorter than your activation time
  5. the retainer plus the per-event fee

basics

~20 s

Always-on routes every ordinary request through the provider all year: a standing commitment plus a latency and dependency tax on quiet days. On-demand is cheaper at rest but leaves minutes of exposure and bills per event.

solid answer

~50 s

Always-on means your traffic permanently transits the provider's network, so mitigation is already in place when an attack starts — nothing to trigger, nothing to wait for. You pay for that with a committed clean-traffic level billed every month, a detour every ordinary request takes on all the quiet days, and a hard dependency: their bad day becomes your outage. On-demand keeps traffic on its normal path until something is detected, then diverts. It is cheaper at rest and adds no everyday latency, but there is a gap — detect, decide, authorise, announce or repoint, wait for it to take effect — that is realistically several minutes, and short bursts can be over before the diversion is complete. On-demand contracts also typically carry a per-event charge on top of the retainer. Many estates split the difference: always-on for the prefixes that cannot tolerate a gap, on-demand for the rest.

go deeper

for a junior

Know the basic distinction: always-on means traffic goes through the provider all the time, on-demand means it is redirected only when an attack is detected. Be able to say that the second one has a delay before protection starts.

for a middle

Explain the mechanics of the gap — detection, decision, activation, convergence — and name what always-on costs on a quiet day: a committed monthly spend, added latency for every request, and a third party in your critical path.

for a senior

Demonstrate the hybrid judgment: which services cannot tolerate a multi-minute gap and therefore justify the standing cost, how you shorten activation by pre-authorising the trigger, and how you keep a rarely used diversion path proven.

for a principal

Be ready to frame it as a spend decision with a stated risk appetite: what an outage of a given length costs the business, who signs for the standing bill, and why a per-event charge for a mitigation that arrived after the attack is still worth renewing.

## The two postures When you rent mitigation capacity, the first architectural decision is whether your traffic goes through the provider **all the time** or **only when you are under attack**. Everything else — cost model, latency, exposure window, blast radius — follows from that one choice. ### Always-on Your traffic is steered into the provider's network permanently. Inspection and filtering are running before an attack begins, so the mitigation posture during an attack is identical to the posture five minutes earlier; there is nothing to switch on. What it costs: - **A standing bill.** Pricing is normally anchored to a committed level of *clean* traffic — the legitimate volume you push through them month after month. Exceed the commit and you are billed for the overage; the attack volume itself is usually not what you pay for, but your own growth is. - **Latency, every day, forever.** Every ordinary request takes whatever path their edge implies. This may be modest, or even negative if their edge is closer to your users than your origin is — but it is a permanent tax you are paying on the 364 days a year when nothing is attacking you, and it must be defended as such. - **A dependency in the critical path.** A provider outage, a misconfiguration on their side, or a filtering rule that misjudges your traffic is now a production incident for you. You have swapped a rare, severe risk (a flood) for a constant, small one (someone else's network in your path). - **Their vantage, not yours.** The control that decides which clients are real is operated by a third party. During an incident you raise a ticket; you do not run a query. ### On-demand Traffic follows its normal path. When an attack is detected, diversion is triggered — the provider begins attracting your traffic, scrubs it, and returns it to you. What it costs: - **A gap.** The exposure window is the sum of several delays, and only one of them is technical: 1. **Detection** — someone or something must notice. If it is a human noticing an alert, this alone can be minutes. 2. **Decision and authorisation** — diverting changes your traffic path; many organisations require a person to approve it. 3. **Activation** — the provider begins attracting traffic and stands up the return path. 4. **Convergence** — the change has to take effect everywhere, which is not instantaneous. Realistically this totals minutes, not seconds. That is the whole game: **an adversary who understands your posture sends bursts shorter than your activation time.** A nine-minute burst against an eleven-minute activation means the service was down, the mitigation arrived after the event, and the provider's dashboard will honestly show that it scrubbed almost nothing. - **A per-event charge.** On-demand contracts commonly pair a lower retainer with a fee each time mitigation is invoked, sometimes with a minimum billing duration far longer than the attack. Frequent short attacks can make on-demand more expensive than always-on while protecting you less. - **A cold path.** The return path and the diversion mechanism are exercised rarely, so they are exactly the kind of thing that turns out to be broken when you finally need it. If you choose on-demand, you must test the diversion on a schedule, in production, during a change window — and that test is itself a small planned outage risk. ## Comparing them honestly | | Always-on | On-demand | |---|---|---| | Exposure at attack start | none | minutes | | Everyday latency | permanent tax | none | | Cost at rest | higher, predictable | lower retainer, per-event fee | | Dependency | constant | only during events | | Path exercised | continuously | rarely, must be tested | | Beats a short burst | yes | frequently no | ## The hybrid, and why it is usually the real answer Most mature estates do not choose one. They put the small number of prefixes or services that genuinely cannot tolerate a multi-minute gap behind always-on protection, and leave everything else on-demand. This is a deliberate trade of money and latency for exposure, made service by service rather than once for the whole estate. The decision needs an explicit statement of what a gap costs. If a nine-minute outage during business hours is survivable and rare, on-demand is defensible and cheaper. If the service is a payment path or a real-time system where a nine-minute gap is a reportable event, the standing bill and the latency tax are the price of not having a gap — and that is the sentence to say out loud in the interview, because it is the sentence that gets the budget approved or refused. ## The failure to name The most common wrong answer is that on-demand is strictly better because it costs less and adds no latency. It costs less *at rest*. It buys you an exposure window that a competent adversary will measure and then send bursts underneath — and the invoice still arrives afterwards for a mitigation that ran after the outage ended.

  • Where exactly do the minutes go in an on-demand activation?
    Detection first, and if that depends on a human noticing an alert it dominates everything else. Then decision and authorisation, because diverting changes the traffic path and is usually a change somebody must approve. Then the provider actually attracting your traffic and standing up the return path, and finally the change taking effect everywhere. Only the last part is a network property; the first two are organisational and are where the time is really lost.
  • How would you argue for renewing an on-demand retainer after mitigation arrived later than the attack ended?
    Separate the retainer from that event. What was bought is capacity that is contractually available and a path that has been proven to work; the failure was the activation time, not the capacity. Then propose fixing the measured stage — automated detection and pre-authorised triggering typically remove more minutes than any change on the provider's side — and price always-on for the specific services where the remaining gap is still unacceptable.
  • Can you test on-demand diversion without an attack?
    Yes, and you must. Schedule a diversion in a change window, verify that traffic actually arrives via the provider, that the return path carries full-size packets, that your origin still accepts the traffic, and measure the wall-clock time from trigger to fully converged. A cold diversion path discovered to be broken during a real flood is the standard on-demand failure, and the only defence is exercising it.

Always-on is a guard permanently on the door: you pay their wages every day and everyone queues slightly. On-demand is a guard you telephone: free until you need them, and the trouble is often over before they arrive.

saying these in an interview costs you the question

  • Says on-demand is strictly better because it is cheaper
  • Quotes an activation time in seconds
  • Ignores the per-event charge on top of the retainer
  • Forgets always-on adds latency on days with no attack
  • Never tests the diversion path until a real attack

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