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Prepare for SOC analyst interviews: triage alerts, read logs and packets, and carry an incident from first signal to close. Covers networks and endpoints, attacker tradecraft, detection and response.
2293 of 2293 questions in your plan: 0 known, 0 in progress, 0 due, 0 skipped, 2293 new. 0 cut, outside your plan.
A SOC analyst loop rarely includes a coding round. In its place there is usually a recruiter screen, a short technical screen, one or two scenario rounds and a conversation about temperament: how you work a queue through a night shift and how you escalate. Some loops add a practical, a capture file or a log export with a question attached. The technical screen is quick and factual: a three-way handshake in a capture, the port a service usually listens on, the servers a DNS lookup passes through. The scenario round usually decides the offer. The interviewer hands over an alert and keeps adding facts: Word has spawned `powershell.exe` with an encoded command, the decoded script reached a domain registered last week, and the same account then requested Kerberos service tickets for several service accounts with RC4 encryption. Or a user forwards a message that passed SPF and still failed DMARC, and you are asked how both can be true. What moves a candidate up a tier is the questions asked before the verdict: which log would show this, whether that log is collected at all, what the host did in the minutes around it, who has to be told before anything is isolated. An entry-level answer names the technique. A stronger one says what evidence would tell it apart from an administrator doing their job, and what it would change so the next alert of its kind is cheaper to close.
Nearly every alert arrives written in the vocabulary of networks, as an address, a port, a domain or a status code, so the plan opens on the wire. The [layered model](/topics/proto-osi) and [TCP](/topics/proto-tcp) come first, with ARP kept for the spoofing it allows. [DNS](/topics/proto-dns) and DHCP follow, since together they tie a name and an address to one machine at a given hour, the question an investigation keeps asking. Web traffic closes the stretch, from methods and cookies through [where TLS is terminated or intercepted](/topics/proto-tls-termination) to the OWASP Top 10, and the crypto module then supplies the hashes, signatures and [certificate chains](/topics/proto-pki-trust-chains) that decide what an encrypted session can be trusted with. Next the plan moves onto the host. Windows comes first, with [the registry and services](/topics/os-windows-registry-services), where much persistence hides, between processes and PowerShell. Linux follows with [permissions](/topics/os-linux-permissions), setuid included, and journald, and a short command-line module puts both to work: what is running, what is listening, where a connection goes. Identity sits after the hosts because [Kerberos](/topics/proto-kerberos) and LDAP are how a domain decides which of them to trust, and [SMB](/topics/proto-smb) and exposed RDP follow as the paths that trust opens from one machine to the next; the cloud module asks the same of [platform identity](/topics/cloud-providers-concepts-identity), where a key lifted from an instance can act without touching a host you monitor. Only with that terrain mapped does the attacker become the subject. [ATT&CK and the kill chain](/topics/sec-threats-attacks) supply the vocabulary, and [LOLBAS](/topics/sec-lolbas) and GTFOBins follow at once, because misuse of a built-in binary is hard to see unless you know its ordinary use. Email security comes next, phishing being the door many incidents start from, with [DMARC](/topics/proto-dmarc) tying SPF and DKIM to the address a user actually sees. The instruments follow: network defenses place the sensors, packet and flow analysis reads what they collect, down to [Wireshark](/topics/sec-wireshark) and tcpdump, and recon turns the view around, scanning your own exposure as an outsider would. SOC work proper comes late on purpose, since the modules before it are the evidence it reads. [Log sources](/topics/sec-security-operations-soc-log-sources) open it, because an alert is only as good as what was recorded, then [triage](/topics/sec-security-operations-alert-triage), EDR and [VirusTotal](/topics/sec-virustotal), whose reports have to be read rather than believed. [Detection engineering](/topics/sec-security-operations-siem-detection), intelligence and hunting move from answering alerts to writing them, and [incident response](/topics/sec-security-operations-incident-response) and forensics carry a confirmed intrusion to its close. [Adversary emulation](/topics/sec-security-operations-adversary-emulation) and measurement test whether any of it works, and the standards module gives it the vocabulary a risk report expects. Last comes the part of the loop about the person rather than the evidence: [behavioral questions](/topics/found-behavioral), which in a SOC loop usually circle back to shift work and escalation, and how the interview process itself runs.
For a first tier-one application, level matters more than any other control: narrow it to junior and keep the rest as the page opens. Tier-one rounds sample the whole plan shallowly, and that cut keeps the breadth while dropping the depth. Before the scenario round, spend a session with study order on random; a queue does not hand you alerts grouped by module, and an answer that only comes in sequence will not come at two in the morning. Candidates from help desk or system administration will find the host modules familiar; their gaps are usually the packet stretch and identity, where the ticket exchanges explain the Active Directory attacks interviewers like to ask about. Network engineers have the opposite profile. With months rather than weeks, the by topics study order serves better, since each later module reads the earlier ones; build a small lab alongside it: a Windows virtual machine logging through Sysmon into a SIEM, attacked from a second machine, gives the triage and detection modules something real to describe. For tier two and above, the hours belong in detection, hunting, response and emulation, where the questions turn to how you know a rule works. The plan is written from the defender's chair. It names attacks and replays them in emulation, but it does not teach exploiting a vulnerability or testing an application by hand. If the job you want leans toward that side, or spans security beyond the operations center, the [Cyber Security Expert roadmap](/roadmaps/cyber-security) is the next plan to open.
A SOC analyst loop rarely includes a coding round. In its place there is usually a recruiter screen, a short technical screen, one or two scenario rounds and a conversation about temperament: how you work a queue through a night shift and how you escalate. Some loops add a practical, a capture file or a log export with a question attached. The technical screen is quick and factual: a three-way handshake in a capture, the port a service usually listens on, the servers a DNS lookup passes through.
The scenario round usually decides the offer. The interviewer hands over an alert and keeps adding facts: Word has spawned powershell.exe with an encoded command, the decoded script reached a domain registered last week, and the same account then requested Kerberos service tickets for several service accounts with RC4 encryption. Or a user forwards a message that passed SPF and still failed DMARC, and you are asked how both can be true.
What moves a candidate up a tier is the questions asked before the verdict: which log would show this, whether that log is collected at all, what the host did in the minutes around it, who has to be told before anything is isolated. An entry-level answer names the technique. A stronger one says what evidence would tell it apart from an administrator doing their job, and what it would change so the next alert of its kind is cheaper to close.
Nearly every alert arrives written in the vocabulary of networks, as an address, a port, a domain or a status code, so the plan opens on the wire. The layered model and TCP come first, with ARP kept for the spoofing it allows. DNS and DHCP follow, since together they tie a name and an address to one machine at a given hour, the question an investigation keeps asking. Web traffic closes the stretch, from methods and cookies through where TLS is terminated or intercepted to the OWASP Top 10, and the crypto module then supplies the hashes, signatures and certificate chains that decide what an encrypted session can be trusted with.
Next the plan moves onto the host. Windows comes first, with the registry and services, where much persistence hides, between processes and PowerShell. Linux follows with permissions, setuid included, and journald, and a short command-line module puts both to work: what is running, what is listening, where a connection goes. Identity sits after the hosts because Kerberos and LDAP are how a domain decides which of them to trust, and SMB and exposed RDP follow as the paths that trust opens from one machine to the next; the cloud module asks the same of platform identity, where a key lifted from an instance can act without touching a host you monitor.
Only with that terrain mapped does the attacker become the subject. ATT&CK and the kill chain supply the vocabulary, and LOLBAS and GTFOBins follow at once, because misuse of a built-in binary is hard to see unless you know its ordinary use. Email security comes next, phishing being the door many incidents start from, with DMARC tying SPF and DKIM to the address a user actually sees. The instruments follow: network defenses place the sensors, packet and flow analysis reads what they collect, down to Wireshark and tcpdump, and recon turns the view around, scanning your own exposure as an outsider would.
SOC work proper comes late on purpose, since the modules before it are the evidence it reads. Log sources open it, because an alert is only as good as what was recorded, then triage, EDR and VirusTotal, whose reports have to be read rather than believed. Detection engineering, intelligence and hunting move from answering alerts to writing them, and incident response and forensics carry a confirmed intrusion to its close. Adversary emulation and measurement test whether any of it works, and the standards module gives it the vocabulary a risk report expects. Last comes the part of the loop about the person rather than the evidence: behavioral questions, which in a SOC loop usually circle back to shift work and escalation, and how the interview process itself runs.
For a first tier-one application, level matters more than any other control: narrow it to junior and keep the rest as the page opens. Tier-one rounds sample the whole plan shallowly, and that cut keeps the breadth while dropping the depth. Before the scenario round, spend a session with study order on random; a queue does not hand you alerts grouped by module, and an answer that only comes in sequence will not come at two in the morning.
Candidates from help desk or system administration will find the host modules familiar; their gaps are usually the packet stretch and identity, where the ticket exchanges explain the Active Directory attacks interviewers like to ask about. Network engineers have the opposite profile. With months rather than weeks, the by topics study order serves better, since each later module reads the earlier ones; build a small lab alongside it: a Windows virtual machine logging through Sysmon into a SIEM, attacked from a second machine, gives the triage and detection modules something real to describe. For tier two and above, the hours belong in detection, hunting, response and emulation, where the questions turn to how you know a rule works.
The plan is written from the defender's chair. It names attacks and replays them in emulation, but it does not teach exploiting a vulnerability or testing an application by hand. If the job you want leans toward that side, or spans security beyond the operations center, the Cyber Security Expert roadmap is the next plan to open.