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Builds the breadth cyber security interviews demand, from SOC analyst screens to pen-testing rounds. Spans operating systems and networking, secure protocols, cloud and SIEM tooling, and scripting.
10187 of 10187 questions in your plan: 0 known, 0 in progress, 0 due, 0 skipped, 10187 new. 0 cut, outside your plan.
Security loops differ more by seat than most engineering loops do, but the usual spine is a recruiter screen, a scenario-based technical screen, a hands-on exercise, one or two conversations with the team, and a behavioral round. The hands-on round takes the form of the job: a packet capture or log export to explain, a vulnerable host or web application to break in a time box, or a written report on what you found. Scripting is checked in passing rather than in an algorithm round: parse this log, pull the indicators out of it. The scenarios test mechanisms. How does a half-open SYN scan look in a capture next to a full connect, and why does the target application not log the first? Why does requesting a service ticket for any account with an SPN let an attacker crack that account's password offline? Why does mail forwarded by a third party fail SPF and still pass DMARC when the DKIM signature is aligned? Why does a password spray slip under a lockout policy that catches a brute force? Seniority shows in where an answer begins. Beginning with a tool name, nmap or Wireshark or Burp, is the junior floor; beginning with what the protocol exposed and why the tool could see it is the middle; a senior is expected to begin at the alert itself, at three in the morning, and work through scoping, containment, which evidence to preserve before touching the host, and what the business is told and when. A design conversation usually joins the loop from middle level on: an architecture to threat-model, or a limited budget and the question of which control to buy first.
Evidence lives on a host and on its wire, and the plan opens there. The first stretch is the operating systems you will be asked to triage, the [host firewall and socket state](/topics/os-networking) that say which process is listening and to whom, and the process and memory tooling that tells a busy box from a compromised one. The network module then climbs from the frame upward through ARP, IP, [TCP](/topics/proto-tcp) and DNS, the terms most attacks and most detections are described in, with [clock synchronization](/topics/proto-ntp) among the services that follow because a timeline is only as good as the clocks it was assembled from. It closes on the network as a defender reads it: segmentation, how BGP routes are filtered, leaked and hijacked, and the syslog, [flow records](/topics/proto-network-telemetry-flow-export) and mirrored ports a sensor is fed from. The second stretch is the longest and is organised by what crosses the wire. The [web stack](/topics/proto-web-transport) leads, since TLS and PKI are reused by much of what follows. [DNSSEC](/topics/proto-dnssec), IPsec and VPNs come straight after it, signing the answers and wrapping the packets the network module carried in the clear. Remote access follows protocol by protocol: SSH from key exchange through agent forwarding and tunneling to [hardening](/topics/proto-ssh-hardening), file transfer, RDP through to its [exposure](/topics/proto-rdp-security-exposure) on the internet, and [SMB](/topics/proto-smb), where lateral-movement questions live. Then the radio edge, [WLAN](/topics/proto-wifi-security) with Bluetooth and NFC, [SRTP](/topics/proto-srtp) for the encrypted media of a voice or video call, and then mail, where [DMARC](/topics/proto-dmarc) comes after SPF and DKIM because it is defined in terms of them. Identity gets its own stretch because most intrusions now begin there: the [federated protocols](/topics/proto-auth-identity) first, then [Kerberos](/topics/proto-kerberos) with its directory and AAA neighbours. Once the protocols are in place the subject changes from the wire to the work. [Application security](/topics/found-appsec) is the developer's half, injection and access control above all. The [security disciplines](/topics/security) then split along the job's lines: threat concepts and threat modeling for everyone; recon, scanners and the pentest distributions on the offensive side; [operations and incident response](/topics/sec-security-operations), network defense and malware analysis on the defensive side; secrets, supply chain and policy as code as engineering controls; and the modules on attacking models and LLMs. The Elastic Stack and [Splunk](/topics/cloud-splunk) follow as the places those detections are written, and [cloud](/topics/cloud-providers-concepts) and [container](/topics/cloud-containers-concepts) concepts come next at the level of the responsibility model and the isolation boundary, not any one console. The last stretch supports the rest. Scripting in Python, Bash and [PowerShell](/topics/os-powershell) turns a procedure into a tool, and PowerShell is also what an adversary runs on a Windows host. SQL and relational concepts are there to query evidence and to know what an injection reaches. [Compliance](/topics/proto-infosec-standards), with GDPR and CCPA, sits late because it is the language of the senior round: risk, controls, evidence and notification deadlines. The plan's last two modules are algorithms, for the loops that borrow a coding screen from software engineering, and the [behavioral round](/topics/found-behavioral).
A SOC analyst screen two weeks away is asked mostly in the vocabulary of the first stretch and the operations module, and the controls can cut the plan down to it: importance at must know, level at the seniority band the posting advertises, study order where the page opens, by frequency. The hours that saves belong in real captures and logs. A pen-test or red-team interview rewards the opposite cut of the same plan: the remote-access and identity protocols, recon and scanners, and hours in [a practice lab or a CTF](/topics/sec-ctf-platforms). Developers moving into security already own the application-security module; the gap is usually below it, in the host and network stretch, so switch study order to by topics, begin at the first module and do not skip the protocols that feel like plumbing. Administrators and network engineers have the reverse gap and can begin at identity. Senior candidates get the most from compliance, cloud and the incident-response material, since their design round is a threat model and their behavioral round is an incident they ran. The plan secures the pipeline from the outside, through supply chain and policy as code, and has no module on building it: no CI system, no infrastructure-as-code tool, no cluster operations. Those questions, and scanning wired into a build, belong to the [DevSecOps roadmap](/roadmaps/devsecops). For a seat that is only the SOC, the [SOC Analyst roadmap](/roadmaps/soc-analyst) is built for that job alone.
Security loops differ more by seat than most engineering loops do, but the usual spine is a recruiter screen, a scenario-based technical screen, a hands-on exercise, one or two conversations with the team, and a behavioral round. The hands-on round takes the form of the job: a packet capture or log export to explain, a vulnerable host or web application to break in a time box, or a written report on what you found. Scripting is checked in passing rather than in an algorithm round: parse this log, pull the indicators out of it.
The scenarios test mechanisms. How does a half-open SYN scan look in a capture next to a full connect, and why does the target application not log the first? Why does requesting a service ticket for any account with an SPN let an attacker crack that account's password offline? Why does mail forwarded by a third party fail SPF and still pass DMARC when the DKIM signature is aligned? Why does a password spray slip under a lockout policy that catches a brute force?
Seniority shows in where an answer begins. Beginning with a tool name, nmap or Wireshark or Burp, is the junior floor; beginning with what the protocol exposed and why the tool could see it is the middle; a senior is expected to begin at the alert itself, at three in the morning, and work through scoping, containment, which evidence to preserve before touching the host, and what the business is told and when. A design conversation usually joins the loop from middle level on: an architecture to threat-model, or a limited budget and the question of which control to buy first.
Evidence lives on a host and on its wire, and the plan opens there. The first stretch is the operating systems you will be asked to triage, the host firewall and socket state that say which process is listening and to whom, and the process and memory tooling that tells a busy box from a compromised one. The network module then climbs from the frame upward through ARP, IP, TCP and DNS, the terms most attacks and most detections are described in, with clock synchronization among the services that follow because a timeline is only as good as the clocks it was assembled from. It closes on the network as a defender reads it: segmentation, how BGP routes are filtered, leaked and hijacked, and the syslog, flow records and mirrored ports a sensor is fed from.
The second stretch is the longest and is organised by what crosses the wire. The web stack leads, since TLS and PKI are reused by much of what follows. DNSSEC, IPsec and VPNs come straight after it, signing the answers and wrapping the packets the network module carried in the clear. Remote access follows protocol by protocol: SSH from key exchange through agent forwarding and tunneling to hardening, file transfer, RDP through to its exposure on the internet, and SMB, where lateral-movement questions live. Then the radio edge, WLAN with Bluetooth and NFC, SRTP for the encrypted media of a voice or video call, and then mail, where DMARC comes after SPF and DKIM because it is defined in terms of them. Identity gets its own stretch because most intrusions now begin there: the federated protocols first, then Kerberos with its directory and AAA neighbours.
Once the protocols are in place the subject changes from the wire to the work. Application security is the developer's half, injection and access control above all. The security disciplines then split along the job's lines: threat concepts and threat modeling for everyone; recon, scanners and the pentest distributions on the offensive side; operations and incident response, network defense and malware analysis on the defensive side; secrets, supply chain and policy as code as engineering controls; and the modules on attacking models and LLMs. The Elastic Stack and Splunk follow as the places those detections are written, and cloud and container concepts come next at the level of the responsibility model and the isolation boundary, not any one console.
The last stretch supports the rest. Scripting in Python, Bash and PowerShell turns a procedure into a tool, and PowerShell is also what an adversary runs on a Windows host. SQL and relational concepts are there to query evidence and to know what an injection reaches. Compliance, with GDPR and CCPA, sits late because it is the language of the senior round: risk, controls, evidence and notification deadlines. The plan's last two modules are algorithms, for the loops that borrow a coding screen from software engineering, and the behavioral round.
A SOC analyst screen two weeks away is asked mostly in the vocabulary of the first stretch and the operations module, and the controls can cut the plan down to it: importance at must know, level at the seniority band the posting advertises, study order where the page opens, by frequency. The hours that saves belong in real captures and logs. A pen-test or red-team interview rewards the opposite cut of the same plan: the remote-access and identity protocols, recon and scanners, and hours in a practice lab or a CTF.
Developers moving into security already own the application-security module; the gap is usually below it, in the host and network stretch, so switch study order to by topics, begin at the first module and do not skip the protocols that feel like plumbing. Administrators and network engineers have the reverse gap and can begin at identity. Senior candidates get the most from compliance, cloud and the incident-response material, since their design round is a threat model and their behavioral round is an incident they ran.
The plan secures the pipeline from the outside, through supply chain and policy as code, and has no module on building it: no CI system, no infrastructure-as-code tool, no cluster operations. Those questions, and scanning wired into a build, belong to the DevSecOps roadmap. For a seat that is only the SOC, the SOC Analyst roadmap is built for that job alone.