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WLAN Security

The security history of Wi-Fi as one branch: why WEP failed, what WPA2 fixed with CCMP, what WPA3 adds with SAE, and the weaknesses each generation left open. Walked end to end in interviews.

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questions

page 1 of 2

In WEP, what do the 24-bit IV and the ICV in each frame do, and why is WEP retired?

level: juniorimportance: must knowfreq 62%

answer

  1. a per-frame value
  2. sent in the clear
  3. key prefix plus shared key
  4. a checksum without a secret
  5. no key management either

basics

~20 s

In WEP each frame's RC4 key is a 24-bit IV, sent in the clear, followed by the shared key, and a CRC-32 ICV is appended. A small IV space repeats and a CRC cannot authenticate, so WEP is retired.

solid answer

~40 s

WEP encrypts each data frame with RC4 under a per-frame key made of a 24-bit **IV** followed by the shared root key. The IV travels in the clear in the frame's 4-octet IV field, and only 2^24 values exist, so keystreams repeat and the construction was later shown to leak the root key to passive observers. The 4-octet **ICV** is a CRC-32 of the payload, encrypted with it; a CRC catches accidents but cannot authenticate anyone, so it is not integrity. WEP also has no replay protection and no key management. Longer keys do not repair this, so WEP was replaced by WPA with TKIP and then WPA2 with CCMP, and the operator's job is to find it and remove it.

go deeper

for a junior

Say that WEP is retired, that its 24-bit IV is sent in the clear and prepended to the shared key, and that the CRC-based ICV is not integrity.

for a middle

Explain how the IV and root key form the RC4 key, name the 4-octet IV and ICV fields, and say why a longer key does not help.

for a senior

Tie each flaw to what it puts at risk, and point out that dynamic WEP and a hidden SSID leave the construction untouched.

for a principal

Frame WEP as a retirement item with a bounded exposure, not a hardening exercise: there is nothing to tune.

## What WEP is Wired Equivalent Privacy is the original 802.11 protection for data frames. It uses the **RC4** stream cipher and **one static root key shared by every device** on the WLAN. NIST SP 800-97 notes that the standard itself specifies only a 40-bit key and that vendors offer non-standard extensions to longer keys, the 104-bit form among them. Nothing in the standard distributes, rotates or retires that key, so management is manual on every access point and client. ## How one frame is protected For each frame the sender picks a 24-bit **initialization vector (IV)**, prepends it to the root key, and uses the result as the RC4 key for that frame. The keystream is XORed with the payload and with a 4-octet **integrity check value (ICV)**, which is a CRC-32 of the payload. The IV is not secret: it is sent in the clear in the frame so the receiver can build the same RC4 key. | Piece | Size | Visible on the air? | |---|---|---| | IV field | 4 octets (a 24-bit IV plus a key index) | yes, in the clear | | Root key | 5 octets (WEP-40) or 13 octets (WEP-104) | never sent | | Per-frame RC4 key | IV followed by root key: 8 or 16 octets | derived, not sent | | ICV | 4 octets | encrypted with the payload | The Linux header names these as `IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN` (4), `IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN` (4), `WLAN_KEY_LEN_WEP40` (5) and `WLAN_KEY_LEN_WEP104` (13), with cipher suite selectors 00-0F-AC:1 and 00-0F-AC:5. The marketing labels "64-bit" and "128-bit" count the IV, so the secret is 40 or 104 bits. ## Why this construction is retired 1. **The IV space is tiny.** There are 2^24 IV values. WEP does not say how the IV is chosen, and when two frames share an IV under the same root key they share a keystream. 2. **The IV is a known prefix of the RC4 key.** The 2001 Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir paper showed that this use of RC4 is insecure for any key size and any IV size, so the root key can be recovered from traffic that was only observed. 3. **The ICV is not integrity.** A CRC-32 has no secret, and a stream cipher passes bit changes through unchanged, so encrypting it adds nothing (NIST SP 800-97, section 3.2.3). 4. **There is no replay protection and no key management.** Section 3.2.4 of the same guide says the cryptography has no counter or timestamp, and every device holds the same key, which also destroys accountability. ## What it puts at risk - **Confidentiality** of every frame on the SSID, for anyone who can receive the radio signal. - **Integrity** of what the receiver accepts, because the check is not keyed. - **Access control**, because whoever holds or recovers the single shared key can join as any device. ## What replaced it, and what the operator does WPA with TKIP was the interim retrofit for WEP-era hardware, and WPA2 with CCMP (AES) is the 802.11i design. The dates and the comparison belong to the material on the security generations. For the operator the rule is simple: - WEP is a flaw in the **design**, so every conforming product is affected and both the access points and the clients have to move to another generation. - There is **no WEP setting that makes it acceptable**: not a longer key, not a rotated key, not a hidden SSID. - hostapd's own `defconfig` describes WEP as an obsolete algorithm "not considered secure" that "should not be used for anything anymore", and since version 2.10 it is out of the default build. - Find every WEP SSID in the estate, contain what cannot be replaced, and retire the rest. ## Overhead and how it is noticed - WEP adds 8 octets to every protected frame (the 4-octet IV field and the 4-octet ICV); CCMP adds 16 (an 8-octet header and an 8-octet MIC). The extra size buys integrity and a packet number, which WEP does not have. - An access point's log does not by itself show that a WEP exposure is being used. The exposure is noticed as a **configuration or scan finding**: a security type of WEP in the access point configuration, or a weak-protocol report from a wireless IDPS or scanner. NIST SP 800-153 asks continuous monitoring to cover devices using weak WLAN protocols. ## Common slips - Blaming the short key alone: the flaw is in how the IV and key are combined, and a 104-bit key is affected too. - Treating the encrypted CRC as a message authentication code. - Treating "dynamic WEP" (per-user keys from 802.1X) as a fix: NIST notes it retains all the weaknesses inherent in WEP.

  • Why does moving from a 40-bit to a 104-bit WEP key not repair the protocol?
    The flaw is the construction, not the key length. The 24-bit IV stays a short, clear prefix of the RC4 key, and the 2001 Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir paper states its result holds for any key size and any modifier size, including the 24-bit IV and the 128-bit modifier of a proposed WEP2. NIST SP 800-97 says longer keys do not mitigate WEP's known flaws.
  • Which parts of a WEP data frame can a passive listener read, and which are encrypted?
    The IV field is in the clear, as is the 802.11 header with its addresses. The payload and the 4-octet ICV are encrypted under the per-frame RC4 key. A listener therefore sees every IV, which is what makes the key prefix a known quantity.
  • A vendor offers 802.1X with dynamic WEP keys as a stronger WEP; is it?
    It improves key distribution, because each user gets session keys derived from EAP, but NIST SP 800-97 says dynamic WEP retains all the weaknesses inherent in WEP. The RC4 construction, the 24-bit IV and the CRC-32 ICV are unchanged, so it is still a finding to retire.

  • WEP is weak only because its key is short.
  • A 128-bit WEP network is safe enough for low-risk devices.
  • Encrypting the CRC-32 turns it into a message authentication code.
  • The IV is a secret nonce that protects the root key.
  • Rotating or hiding things around WEP makes it acceptable.
open as a page

How does a rogue access point differ from an evil twin, and why can't a client tell a twin by SSID and security type alone?

level: juniorimportance: must knowfreq 55%

basics

~20 s

A rogue AP is any unauthorised access point, possibly wired into your network; an evil twin impersonates an authorised SSID. A client cannot tell a twin by name and security type, because both are advertised labels, not proof of identity.

open as a page

Across WEP, WPA, WPA2 and WPA3, what did each Wi-Fi security generation fix, and which should a WLAN still offer?

level: juniorimportance: must knowfreq 68%

basics

~20 s

WEP used one static RC4 key; WPA's TKIP retrofitted per-packet keys and integrity onto that hardware; WPA2 made AES-based CCMP the baseline; WPA3 adds SAE, required PMF and a 192-bit mode. Offer WPA3, WPA2 only for stragglers.

open as a page

On a WPA2 network, what does the "AES" encryption setting actually refer to, and what does it protect in each data frame?

level: juniorimportance: must knowfreq 52%

basics

~20 s

In WPA2, "AES" means CCMP: AES in CCM mode with a 128-bit per-session temporal key. It encrypts each data frame's body and adds an 8-octet MIC that detects tampering, while the MAC header travels in the clear.

open as a page

In WPA2-Personal, how do the client and access point prove they share the passphrase without ever sending it over the air?

level: juniorimportance: must knowfreq 48%

basics

~20 s

Both sides turn the passphrase into the same Pairwise Master Key locally, swap random nonces in the four-way handshake, derive a session key from them, and prove possession with a MIC only the correct key can produce.

open as a page

What went wrong in WPA2's four-way handshake in the 2017 key reinstallation (KRACK) disclosure, and why did fixing it not need a new protocol?

level: juniorimportance: must knowfreq 58%

basics

~20 s

In WPA2's four-way handshake, a client reinstalled the same key whenever message 3 was retransmitted, resetting its nonce and replay counter. Patches install a key only once and stay compatible, so no new protocol was needed.

open as a page

In WPA2, how does Personal (PSK) mode differ from Enterprise (802.1X) mode in who is authenticated and where the keys come from?

level: juniorimportance: must knowfreq 70%

basics

~20 s

WPA2-Personal gives every device one shared passphrase that becomes the same PMK on all of them. WPA2-Enterprise authenticates each user or device with 802.1X/EAP against an authentication server, so every session gets its own PMK.

open as a page

What does Wi-Fi Enhanced Open (OWE) change for customers of an open café guest network, and what does it leave unprotected?

level: juniorimportance: must knowfreq 32%

basics

~20 s

Wi-Fi Enhanced Open (OWE, RFC 8110) gives every client its own encryption keys through an unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman exchange, so other customers cannot read its traffic off the air. It authenticates nobody and protects only the wireless hop.

open as a page

In WPA3-Personal, what does the SAE handshake do differently from WPA2-Personal's pre-shared key, and why does it matter?

level: juniorimportance: must knowfreq 46%

basics

~20 s

SAE is a password-authenticated key exchange: both sides prove they know the passphrase without sending anything a recording can test guesses against, and every run yields a fresh PMK. WPA2-Personal uses one fixed passphrase-derived PMK.

open as a page

What is WPA3-Personal transition mode, and why would a network run it while migrating a mixed fleet off WPA2-Personal?

level: juniorimportance: must knowfreq 42%

basics

~20 s

WPA3-Personal transition mode is one SSID advertising both the WPA2 PSK and the WPA3 SAE key management with PMF optional, so SAE-capable clients use SAE with PMF while older clients keep the same passphrase over PSK.

open as a page

What was TKIP in the first WPA generation, and why did it keep WEP's RC4 cipher while changing keys, integrity and replay checks?

level: juniorimportance: must knowfreq 62%

basics

~20 s

TKIP is the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol, an emergency retrofit that let WEP-era hardware run WPA after a firmware or driver update. It kept the RC4 engine and added per-packet key mixing, the Michael integrity check and a sequence counter.

open as a page

Why can forged deauthentication or disassociation frames drop clients from a WPA2 network, and why does 802.11w PMF stop it?

level: middleimportance: must knowfreq 42%

basics

~20 s

Legacy 802.11 management frames such as deauthentication and disassociation carry no authentication, so a frame claiming to come from the access point can end an association. PMF protects them, so a receiver that negotiated PMF ignores unprotected ones.

open as a page

How does WPA2's CCMP use AES in counter mode and CBC-MAC to give each data frame both confidentiality and integrity with one key?

level: middleimportance: must knowfreq 38%

basics

~20 s

CCMP runs AES-CCM with one 128-bit temporal key: CBC-MAC over the protected header fields and the plaintext yields an 8-octet tag, then counter mode encrypts the body and the tag. The receiver decrypts, recomputes the tag and drops mismatches.

open as a page

In WPA2's four-way handshake, what does each of the four EAPOL-Key messages carry, and what does each one prove?

level: middleimportance: must knowfreq 40%

basics

~20 s

Message 1 brings the AP's ANonce; message 2 the client's SNonce and a MIC proving it holds the PMK; message 3 the AP's MIC, RSN element and wrapped GTK with the order to install; message 4 confirms installation.

open as a page

For an 802.1X Wi-Fi SSID, how do EAP-TLS, PEAP, EAP-TTLS and TEAP differ in what each demands of the client fleet?

level: middleimportance: must knowfreq 48%

basics

~20 s

EAP-TLS needs a certificate and private key on every client and no password. PEAP and EAP-TTLS need only a server certificate and run a password method inside a TLS tunnel. TEAP can chain machine and user authentication in one tunnel.

open as a page

For a WPA3-Personal SAE exchange recorded in full by an eavesdropper, what can the recording still reveal, and what can it not?

level: middleimportance: must knowfreq 34%

basics

~20 s

A recorded SAE exchange reveals metadata — MAC addresses, the group, timing — but nothing that confirms or rules out a passphrase guess, and nothing that recovers the PMK even if the passphrase leaks later.

open as a page

What does 802.11w Protected Management Frames actually protect on a WPA2 or WPA3 network, and which management frames does it leave unprotected?

level: middleimportance: must knowfreq 34%

basics

~20 s

802.11w Protected Management Frames protects robust management frames: Deauthentication, Disassociation and most Action frames, unicast under the pairwise key and group-addressed under BIP with the IGTK. Beacons without beacon protection, probes, authentication and association frames stay unprotected.

open as a page

Why is TKIP's 64-bit Michael MIC weak by design, and how does the two-failures-in-a-minute countermeasure bound that weakness?

level: middleimportance: must knowfreq 38%

basics

~20 s

Michael is a cheap keyed check sized for WEP-era hardware, so it is weak. TKIP bounds it: after two MIC failures within a minute, the access point deauthenticates its TKIP clients and stops TKIP traffic for one minute.

open as a page

Why is WEP's encrypted CRC-32 ICV not an integrity check, and what kind of code does a protocol need instead?

level: middleimportance: should knowfreq 30%

basics

~20 s

WEP's ICV is a CRC-32 of the payload. A CRC has no secret and responds predictably to changes, and RC4 passes bit changes through unchanged, so encrypting it does not authenticate anything. Integrity needs a keyed code.

open as a page

In WEP, how do the IV and the root key form the RC4 key, and why is keystream reuse expected on a busy network?

level: middleimportance: should knowfreq 34%

basics

~20 s

WEP's per-frame RC4 key is the clear 24-bit IV followed by the static root key. Only the IV changes, and only about 16.8 million values exist, so IVs repeat, and two frames under one IV and key share a keystream.

open as a page

What is the WPS PIN design flaw behind the 11,000-attempt figure, and why is switching PIN registration off the answer?

level: middleimportance: should knowfreq 30%

basics

~20 s

A WPS PIN has eight digits, but the last is a checksum and the protocol confirms the PIN in two halves, so at most 11,000 attempts cover it. Lock-down only slows that; the answer is to switch WPS PIN registration off.

open as a page

What does Wi-Fi Alliance certification require for WPA3 and PMF, and what extra security rules apply to networks in 6 GHz?

level: middleimportance: should knowfreq 34%

basics

~20 s

The Wi-Fi Alliance makes WPA3 mandatory for certified devices and requires PMF on all new certified devices and on WPA3 networks. 6 GHz goes further: RSN only, PMF required, and no WEP, TKIP or PSK.

open as a page

What does the 8-octet CCMP header carry in a WPA2 data frame, and how does its packet number stop replayed frames?

level: middleimportance: should knowfreq 30%

basics

~20 s

The CCMP header carries a 48-bit packet number, the ExtIV bit and a 2-bit Key ID. The sender increments the number per frame; the receiver drops any authenticated frame whose number is not higher than the last accepted.

open as a page

In WPA2, where does the PMK come from, and what do the KCK, KEK and TK carved from the PTK each protect?

level: middleimportance: should knowfreq 30%

basics

~20 s

The PMK comes from the passphrase via PBKDF2 in Personal mode, or from the EAP MSK in Enterprise. The PTK derived from it splits into the KCK for handshake MICs, the KEK for wrapping group keys, and the TK for unicast data.

open as a page

Which networks and cipher suites did the WPA2 key reinstallation flaw affect, and does changing the Wi-Fi passphrase mitigate it?

level: middleimportance: should knowfreq 34%

basics

~10 s

It affected WPA and WPA2, Personal and Enterprise, under TKIP, CCMP and GCMP alike; TKIP and GCMP were hit hardest. Changing the passphrase does not prevent or mitigate it; updating devices does.

open as a page

When an office moves from WPA2-Personal to WPA3-Personal (SAE), which Personal-mode weaknesses does SAE fix and which still need Enterprise?

level: middleimportance: should knowfreq 42%

basics

~20 s

SAE fixes what a recorded exchange reveals: each session gets a fresh PMK and a listener cannot test passwords offline. It leaves the credential model alone: one shared password, no per-user identity, and revoking anyone still means changing it everywhere.

open as a page

How does OWE give each client its own keys on an open 802.11 network, and which frames carry its key exchange?

level: middleimportance: should knowfreq 20%

basics

~20 s

An OWE access point lists the OWE AKM in its RSN element. The client puts a Diffie-Hellman public key in its association request, the access point answers in the association response, and each side derives a per-client PMK for the four-way handshake.

open as a page

When a venue's guest SSID moves to OWE but keeps its captive portal for terms of use, what does each do, and in what order?

level: middleimportance: should knowfreq 16%

basics

~20 s

OWE runs first, inside 802.11 association, and encrypts the client's wireless link with its own keys. Only then does the client get an address and meet the captive portal, which records acceptance of the terms. OWE encrypts; the portal gates access.

open as a page

In SAE, what do the Commit and Confirm messages carry, in which 802.11 frames do they travel, and what still runs after them?

level: middleimportance: should knowfreq 24%

basics

~10 s

SAE Commit (group, scalar, element) and Confirm (send-confirm counter, confirm value) travel in 802.11 Authentication frames before association; they yield the PMK, and association plus the four-way handshake follow.

open as a page

In TKIP, how is each frame's RC4 key built, and how does the TKIP sequence counter let a receiver reject replayed frames?

level: middleimportance: should knowfreq 28%

basics

~20 s

Each TKIP frame gets its own RC4 key, mixed from the temporal key, transmitter address and a 48-bit sequence counter (TSC). The receiver silently drops a frame whose TSC is not higher than the last accepted on that priority channel.

open as a page

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