SLSA & Build Provenance

A provenance statement binds to a digest of the artifact's bytes, not to the source revision. A rebuild that picks up a patched base produces different bytes and a new digest, so statements issued for the old build no longer match the artifact in hand.

The three claims answer who vouched, what is inside and how it was built. None of them says the recorded source was reviewed, whether a listed component is actually exploitable here, or whether anything enforces the checks at deploy time.

Only that whoever held the signing key asserted that claim about those exact bytes. A predicate type names an assertion's schema, never its truth; value depends on who may issue that type.

Yes. Hosted is a trust property, not a purchase: the build runs as a service the projects being built cannot modify. An on-prem builder qualifies when its operators are separate from its users and its configuration is outside their control.

An archived attestation is evidence only while its trust chain can still be evaluated; once the issuing platform and keys are gone it is unverifiable. A deterministic build with source, inputs and toolchain preserved lets an auditor re-derive the digest.

Not as provenance. buildType is the document defining which parameters exist and which a caller controls, so without it you cannot tell whether matching repository and ref pins the build. You have authenticity from the signature, not verified provenance.